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FOREWORD
Our securities markets are the envy of the world, both because of
their relative stability and because the degree and quality of disclosure
required for registration thereon is generally higher than is required
elsewhere. Despite this confidence, however, even our markets gyrate, as they reflect the daily change in investor sentiment as to the
status of our economy. To a large extent, market performance controls investment and political decisions at every level of our lives.
Maintaining healthy markets, therefore, is essential to the well being
and stability of our society, and healthy markets require investor confidence and trust.
The public is increasingly investing in the securities markets, either
directly or indirectly, through IRAs, Keogh plans, and other pension
devices.' Moreover, the products being offered to the public-limited
partnerships, ADRs, derivatives, etc.-are becoming more complex
and sophisticated. As a result of this increased activity, litigation between the public and members of the securities industry has increased
dramatically. How are these disputes to be resolved?
The courthouse, of course, is one avenue of resolution. Experience
has shown, however, that this method is both expensive and time consuming, and relief unduly delayed or made prohibitively expensive
often results in the denial of justice. With greater frequency, such disputes are being channelled into arbitration, which is supposed to provide the advantage of a speedy and economical resolution of disputes
by persons knowledgeable in the area. Unless arbitration procedures
are fair both in fact and in appearance, however, their present popularity, as a means of resolving securities disputes, will begin to wane.
Arbitration is hardly a modem day phenomena. Aristotle wrote:
Equity is justice in that it goes beyond the written law. And it is
equitable to prefer arbitration to the law court, for the arbitrator
keeps equity in view, whereas the judge looks only to the law, and
the reason why arbitrators were appointed was that equity might
prevail.a
The use of arbitration to resolve securities disputes between the industry and its customers can be traced back to 1872 at the New York
Stock Exchange ("NYSE"). 3 Since that time, numerous other selfregulatory organizations ("SROs") have established arbitration programs for the settlement of such disputes.
1. See Arthur Levitt, Today's SEC: Putting Investors First,Participant, February
1995, at 12.
2. See Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration, The Arbitrator's Manual i
(1992).
3. Philip J. Hoblin, Jr., Securities Arbitration: Procedures, Strategies, Cases § 1-2
(1988).
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Industry members could be forced into an arbitration forum even
absent a pre-dispute arbitration agreement because of the rules of the
various SROs to which they belong.4 The public, however, could not
be so required unless a pre-dispute arbitration agreement was in
place.5 Moreover, before 1987, the public could largely escape arbitration, despite an arbitration agreement, if it alleged violations under
the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts. 6 After the McMahon7 and Rodriguez8 decisions, however, this escape route was closed.9
Since then, not only have the number of SRO arbitrations
mushroomed, but the cases have become much more complex. Not
only are arbitrators now asked to weigh the merits of increasingly sophisticated products, but they also are required to delve into the intricacies of RICO claims, punitive damages, discrimination cases, and
1933 and 1934 Act violations.
The simpler SRO rules of the 1970s gave way to the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration's more detailed Uniform Code of
Arbitration rules of the 1980s.10 Now in the 1990s, complaints are
arising that arbitration has lost its way and, in fact, is becoming more
like the courthouse. The present method of resolving securities disputes is clearly at a crossroad.
Can the industry and its customers and employees agree on the
ground rules of arbitration combat, or should we again revert to the
voluntary atmosphere that existed before McMahon?" Before we
jump at the latter suggestion, however, we must consider the unthinkable effect of unleashing thousands of arbitration disputes back into a
court system that itself is on the verge of collapse.
Indeed, many still feel that arbitration should be the primary means
of settling securities disputes. If that requires some further adjustments to the process, so be it. The price will be small enough in view
of the advantages of arbitration to both the industry and the public.
The public's perception of fairness, however, must be zealously
guarded, for it extends far beyond the issue of arbitration. It goes to
the very heart of the public's trust in the securities markets themselves. This trust must be preserved for those markets to stay healthy.
Awaiting judicial and/or legislative guidance over the next few years
could prove interesting, eventful, and in some cases unsettling. It
4. Constantine N. Katsoris, The Level Playing Field, 17 Fordham Urb. L.J. 419,
423 n.27 (1990).
5. Id
6. See Wdlko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 432 (1953); Katsoris, supra note 4, at 423-26.
7. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
8. Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
9. Katsoris, supra note 4, at 426.
10. Id at 427-31.
11. See Constantine N. Katsoris, Should McMahon Be Revisited?, 59 Brooklyn L.
Rev. 1113 (1993).
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would be preferable, for all concerned, if some of these issues instead
could be resolved consensually.
With this in mind, the New York Stock Exchange recently sponsored a Symposium On Arbitration in the Securities Industry, which
spanned two days, November 21 and December 5, 1994. Participants
included leading experts in the field of securities arbitration, including, academics, economists, investment bankers, brokers, investors,
accountants, regulators, attorneys, and students.
Although many subjects were discussed, the Symposium focused on
seven specific areas:
(1) pre-dispute arbitration agreements;
(2) the eligibility (six-year) rule;
(3) discovery;
(4) non-attorney representation;
(5) employment discrimination;
(6) arbitration training and selection; and
(7) punitive damages.
In addition, one speaker discussed the banking industry's experience
with arbitration, and another explained a study that sought to streamline the SRO arbitration process by unifying all such arbitrations into
a single and independent forum.
The focus of the presentations ranged from a detailed analysis of
the relevant issues to a practical and frank discussion of the problems
involved. As a result of these open discussions, some immediate improvements are achievable, for example, in the areas of discovery and
arbitrator training and selection. In other areas, such as employment
discrimination, a dialogue was established from which future consensus hopefully can be reached.
Because of its extreme importance, the issue of punitive damages
was singled out and exhaustively discussed at both sessions of the
Symposium by two separate sets of panelists. Since the Symposium,
the United States Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.," which, inter alia, upheld
arbitrators' authority to award punitive damages.13
Although no one at the time knew what the outcome of Mastrobuono would be, the possible effects of the decision, regardless of
the outcome, were thoroughly discussed at the Symposium. Perhaps
now that the decision is out, much of the extensive anticipatory discussion that took place can be revisited for further consideration. How
this issue is handled could very well determine whether the arbitration
12. No. 94-18, 1995 U.S. Lexis 1820 (U.S. Mar. 6, 1995), rev'g 20 F-3d 713 (7th Cir.
1994).
13. Id at *21 (holding that the arbitration panel's punitive award was within the
scope of the parties' contract).
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of securities disputes will remain essentially mandatory or revert to
the basically voluntary procedure it was before McMahon.'4
A special thanks goes to William H. Donaldson, Richard A. Grasso,
and James E. Buck, Chairman, President, and Secretary, respectively,
of the NYSE, for conceiving the idea for this most timely Symposium.
Down the road, jurists, academics, legislators, and practitioners will
point to the frankness and openness of these discussions, which exhaustively fleshed out these most sensitive issues.
I also would like to thank my co-moderator, Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., Berle Professor of Law at Columbia Law School, for his able
assistance. His sharp wit and piercing questions further stimulated an
already lively discussion.
This issue of the Fordham Law Review represents the edited synopsis of the colloquy of the Symposium, with footnotes added for clarity
and synthesis. In this regard, a special thanks to Robert S. Clemente,
the Director of Arbitration of the NYSE, for helping to plan and execute the nuts, bolts, and logistics that make such a Symposium work
and for his tireless assistance in the editing of the very lengthy transcript that resulted. I also would like to thank the editors of the Fordham Law Review for their invaluable suggestions and assistance in
editing and expediting the publication of this document.
CONSTANTINE N. KATSORIS
Wilkinson Professor of Law
Fordham University School of Law

14. See Katsoris, supra note 11, at 1153-54.

